OK, now I know Caltrans has really lost it. Or never had it in the first place.

They’re now saying (as reported Monday by our buddy Jaxon) that they can’t find any proof that required testing was done on the questionable bolts. Nor can they find any proof that required inspections of the contractors making the bolts were made.

Caltrans Chief Deputy Director Richard Land is quoted as saying “The documentation problem is a concern.” I’ve got news for Mr. Land: It’s not a “concern”. It’s the core of the problem.

I’m not sure what world he’s in. In the real world, the way QA works is that testing is done and the result of the testing is documented. That documentation is used as the basis of a decision: proceed or don’t proceed. If the documentation doesn’t exist, then the testing wasn’t done. It doesn’t matter if the physical work of doing the test was performed or not, if the results weren’t documented, the work wasn’t completed.

The article references exactly one QA inspector who did her job: Mary Madere, who inspected bolts produced by a sub-contractor and reported that they passed her inspection (a review of the sub-contractor’s documentation and a visual inspection of the rods). And yet, the article implies that she was delinquent because she did a “random review” of the documentation. “Random” has a very specific meaning in the world of testing. It’s rarely possible to test every item in a set of physical objects or every input to a piece of software. So you work with a sub-set that is typical of the entire set. With physical objects, frequently that’s best done by random selection. Unless there was a requirement that all documentation had to be reviewed, Ms Madere is not delinquent here; she did her job.

On the other hand, the unnamed inspectors who were responsible for reviewing bolts produced by other sub-contractors, seem to be culpable. (I grant the possibility that all of their reports were misfiled; I’m speaking on the basis of the available information. Frankly, I find it extremely unlikely that it’s a filing problem. Based on the story, it seems like there is no record of the work having been done: no reports, no travel expenses, no complaints about late flights, no nothing.) Ditto for the resident engineer who was responsible for a final review of Ms Madere’s report. From a practical perspective, if there is no report, then the work wasn’t done. Somebody needs to start documenting who was responsible for testing what, who was responsible for reviewing what, and of those people, who didn’t do their jobs. Those are the people whose necks should be on the chopping block.

Unfortunately for Ms Madere, she has now been identified and associated with the Bolt Botch; if someone is scrambling to divert attention from their own failure (and you had better believe there’s a lot of that going on at Caltrans right now), that makes her an easy choice to be a scapegoat. Far easier than identifying and those who were truly responsible. Safer, too, as the chain of responsibility goes much higher in the organization chart than one lonely QA inspector.

A significant Bay Bridge Bolt Botch update in less than 400 words?

You bet!

We had two articles from our friend Jaxon over the weekend that show that the Bay Bridge’s problems date back to the design phase. Documents released by Caltrans show an ongoing pattern of issues being raised then minimized or ignored.

Saturday’s article shows that bolts were improperly prepared on at least two occasions. One set of bolts was cleaned with brake cleaner prior to galvanization instead of being sand-blasted as per the contract. The sub-contractor stated that the use of brake cleaner had been authorized by the primary contractor, Dyson Corp., but could not produce documentation of the authorization because of a “computer issue”. A different sub-contractor “touched up” flaws in the galvanization with an aerosol product despite a general Caltrans ban on the use of aerosol galvanization. In both cases the rods were accepted despite the incorrect preparation.

Sunday, Jaxon informed us that the potential problems of hardened, galvanized steel were raised during the design phase in January 2003. In-house steel experts pointed out that such bolts were “prone to cracking in a moist marine environment…and shouldn’t be used.” The design team and Caltrans officials overrode Caltrans’ own rules to follow a suggestion from a sales manager at Dyson Corp. She pointed out that similar galvanized bolts had been used two years earlier in a seismic refit of the Richmond/San Rafael bridge. Caltrans’ corrosion expert agreed that, based on the earlier bridge’s results, the bolts in question could work, but specific tests for strength and flexibility should be performed on delivery. No evidence that those tests were conducted has been found. The steel experts who originally raised the concern about the bolts were not consulted in making the decision. During the bidding process, two manufacturers flat out refused to bid due to their concerns about the use of galvanized steel in a marine environment, but even that didn’t cause Caltrans to reconsider.

That stupidity is contagious is well-known. The founder of the firm that came up with the unique “self-anchored” design hated it. When it was chosen in 1998, he was quoted as saying “This will be building a monument to stupidity.” It’s been down hill all the way since then.

One final thought from the principal architect: “I assume it is safe. I honestly don’t know much about the bolts. That’s engineering.”

(398 words)

It’s been three weeks since I last wrote about the Bay Bridge Bolt Botch, and I’ll bet some you thought – or even hoped – I had forgotten about it. No such luck and my apologies to those of you who find these posts boring. The truth is just that things have been pretty quiet for the bridge, at least from a QA standpoint. But let’s go ahead and get caught up.

On 1 June, our good buddy Jaxon shared the information that more than 600 bolts are harder than the level set by John Fisher, who Jaxon calls a “renowned civil engineer” and who is, not coincidentally, a member of the independent panel reviewing the state of the bridge. The number of potentially-problematic rods comes from pre-installation testing and purchase records, not from current field tests; many of the bolts in question are inaccessible and cannot be field tested. This article also notes that simulated corrosion and aging tests are being done now, and are expected to be complete “by late July.”

A few days later, Matier & Ross broke the news that Caltrans’ Chief Deputy Director Richand Land will be assigned full-time to the Bay Bridge to provide ongoing liason to Caltrans headquarters for all of the reviews going on. The move is touted as offering the public a high level of confidence, since Land is a licensed engineer. Speaking as a member of the public, I find that less than reassuring, given that we still don’t know which engineers signed off on the unfixable bridge design and the use of the overly hard rods in the first place.

Meanwhile, on the 4th, the Chron ran an independent editorial opinion from Bill Wattenburg, who was responsible for blocking deployment of BART’s train control system in the face of safety concerns. Wattenburg reiterates many of the questions we’ve been asking all along regarding approvals and signoffs, and also calls for a totally independent review instead of the current review by a team selected by Caltrans. He also raises one interesting point I haven’t seen before: Caltrans has not revealed what magnitude of earthquake has been used in simulated testing of the current design. Was it the same as the 1989 Loma Prieta quake, or something higher?

Word of the Bolt Botch continues to spread. Sunday’s New York Times ran a fairly piece on the situation. The article itself doesn’t have a whole lot of information we haven’t seen before – although it does note that a decision whether to open the new bridge on time must be made by 10 July, the first time I’ve seen a specific date for the decision cited* – but it does have an accompanying graphic that gives the best explanation I’ve seen for the “saddle” fix for attaching the seismic shear keys. The NYT also quotes oversight panel member John Fisher as being optimistic about meeting the Labor Day weekend opening.

* Actually, that appears to be an error by the NYT. As I said in an earlier post, July 10 is the date by which Caltrans must make a decision on making a fix, not making the decision about when the bridge will open.

A lot of jokes, few of them actually funny, have been made about a proposal to name half of the bridge for former San Francisco mayor Willie Brown. The resolution introduced to the state assembly would rename the western half of the bridge (which has already been seismically refitted, and does not apparently have any bolt issues), leaving the eastern half sole possession of the name “San Francisco-Oakland Bay Bridge”. As noted in one of the earliest posts on the bridge, Brown was one of the leading figures in delaying the construction of the new bridge through insisting on an iconic design, and was also one of the first voices heard calling the bolt problem a “PR disaster”. As far as I can tell, he’s been silent on whether he wants his name associated with said PR disaster.

One final note for today: The similarly trouble-plagued floating Rt 520 bridge in Seattle is now sending its cracked pontoons to Portland for repairs. Maybe somebody in Portland would be willing to take on the task of fixing the Bay Bridge too? At least Portland has a major port that bridge segments could be shipped into. Think about it, folks: based on the work done so far, it could be a boon to Portland’s economy for decades to come.

Yesterday, Caltrans presented the Metropolitan Transportation Commission with an update on the state of the now-infamous rods. The news is, not to put too fine a point on it, lousy. Testing is in progress, and they have set July 10 as the “drop-dead” date for scheduling the fix. That’s correct: not the date for the fix, but the date to set the date for the fix. As our friend Jaxon reports, Caltrans admits that if the date slips past Labor Day weekend, the combination of traffic needs, weather, and holidays could add months to the schedule. Jaxon also notes that Governor Brown has ordered an independent review of Caltrans to make it “a better department”. This is not a review of the bridge – that’s a separate, federal review. This is a review of Caltrans’ policies and processes intended to make the agency “more transparent”.

Then there is yesterday morning’s news break (thanks Jaxon), that expansion joints on the bridge’s integrated bike path were welded in place. The bolts in the joints need to be free to move as the path expands and contracts in response to changes in temperature. Welding the bolts prevents them from moving, and the result is that hundreds of them are known to be broken, and hundreds more need to be inspected and probably will need to be replaced.

What is it about bolts on the Bay Bridge? Forget the children, will nobody think of the bolts?

Ahem.

Seriously, though, the bike path was installed in 2008, yet the improper welds weren’t discovered until an inspection was done in 2012. Where the heck was the QA? Didn’t anyone check the installation at the time it was done? Granted that these bolts, unlike the seismic support rods we’ve been focused on, are not structural, but as key elements of the bike path railing, they are a significant safety component. If the installation was reviewed, there should be documentation of who reviewed it and approved the incorrect installation – which would be useful information in determining other potential problem spots. If the installation wasn’t reviewed, then one has to ask what other components of the bridge haven’t been reviewed.

Other notes on the current state of the bridge.

Actually, Caltrans’ comments on the date are just confirmation of information presented by the Chron’s investigative reporters Matier & Ross, who noted yesterday that we won’t know for weeks if the bridge will open Labor Day weekend or at some time after that. They pointed out that testing of the remaining galvanized steel rods is still going on and is unlikely to be completed before the end of June, and that even when that work is complete, there will still be the independent review by the Federal Highway Administration to be wrapped up before a decision can be made. And nobody is making any predictions about how long the federal review will take: this is, everyone says, uncharted territory.

Tuesday’s Chron featured a editorial and a pair of opinion pieces. Steve Lee, the president of a professional organization of state-employed engineers touts Caltrans’ inspectors for having “consistently done their job” and references 80,000 pages of documentation of their effort. Does that include inspection of the bike path railings prior to 2012? An unsigned editorial responds to statements by Caltrans and points out that given what we know now, the most compelling argument for opening the new bridge is not that it’s safe, but that it’s safer than the old bridge; the editorial then goes on to ask the same question I’ve been asking: “Who is responsible?” What exactly went wrong, and who signed off it? (Note: links in this paragraph are to the Chron’s pay site and may not be accessible without a subscription.)

And then there’s the best (by which I mean “most entertainingly stupid”) opinion, one I call “The Brooklyn Bridge Solution”. Leal Charonnat, an architect and engineer, suggests that Caltrans should sell the bridge tower to some community that needs a tower for a bridge that is not in an earthquake zone and not in a marine environment. Excuse me? We should try to sell a bridge that uses components that have been banned on a federal level and that are already known to be faulty? Who in their right mind would buy the tower, even at the 40% discount he proposes? Even if someone was stupid enough to do so, what does he think is a suitably “earthquake-free” area? A quick look at the USGS earthquake risk maps for the US suggests that northern North Dakota may be at low risk and not a marine environment – but it has some rather dramatic temperature extremes that can’t be good for known-fragile steel. Finally, even if somebody wants to buy the tower and determines that it’s safe, how would it be shipped? The segments were literally shipped from China to Oakland, but ships are not very useful means of transportation in non-marine environments. Shipping by truck or rail seems impractical at best. And to cap it off, he suggests a complete redesign to replace the tower – if we hadn’t been through two major redesigns already, we might actually have a functional bridge by now…

On a related note, check out Chron author Peter Hartlaub’s piece on the future of San Francisco’s architecture as revealed in “Star Trek: Into Darkness”. Most of his comments are spot-on, but he does neglect to point out that Caltrans would have to be pretty heavily involved in the construction. Bets on whether inspections are conducted and documented any better in 2259 than 2009?